CONTENTS

FORWARD - Major General John B. Coulter (Not Included)
INTRODUCTION - General Mark Clark (Not Included)
EARLY HISTORY - A Brief history of WW1
TRAINING FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR
THE GUSTAV LINE -  Minturno, May 1944
THE SECOND PHASE
THE DRIVE ON ROME AND TO THE NORTH - May, June, July 1944
BETWEEN ATTACKS
THE GOTHIC LINE - September 1944
MORE MOUNTAINS

"SUPPLEMENT"
THE LUCCA PLAIN AND THE SILLARO VALLEY
THE LAST ATTACK
    THE PO VALLEY CAMPAIGN
    WINDING UP

Map Index - Map sketches from the booklet were created.  GO TO MAP INDEX

Organization Chart and list of units within the 85th Division -  Organization

Distinguishing Unit Insignias of units in the 85th Division -  DUIs

THE EARLY HISTORY

 It was in another war against the Germans that the Division was first established as part of the National Army, on August 25, 1917. Organized at Camp Custer, Michigan it became known as the Custer Division.

   After nearly a year's training, the Division embarked for England. From here the 339^th Infantry Regiment, with attached engineer and medical units, was shipped to Russia where it participated in bitter fighting against the Bolshevik Revolutionary Army. The remainder of the Division was moved to France where individual organizations supported the IV, V, and VI Corps. In France the Division served primarily as a replacement depot division, furnishing some 20,000 replacements to other organizations. Several units, however, remaining intact---the 160th Field Artillery Battalion, the 310th Field Signal Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 310th Engineers and the 310th Ammunition Train - saw action on the Western Front, in Lorraine. in the St. Mihiel operation, and in the Meuse-Argonne sector.

  At the close of the war parts of the Division served in Germany in the American Army of Occupation. By August 1919, however, the last elements of the Division had returned to the United States.

   Shortly after this the Division was inactivated. During the years of peace that followed it continued to exist in the VI Corps Area as a Reserve Division with Reserve Officer personnel.

WW1 Uniform of a 'Custerman'.
Originally, WW1 patches were sewn into a square piece of khaki.

 In January, 1942 the War Department ordered the reorganization of the 85th Division as a triangular unit{*}. The Division was reactivated at Camp Shelby Mississippi on May 15th. Brigadier General Wade H, Haislip was designated as the Commanding General, becoming Major General Haislip shortly before assuming command. The Official Mobilization Training Program was begun early in June. In January, 1943, the first programs were undertaken in the training of Combat Teams, as the next step in developing the coordination of all the elements of the Division in preparation for combat.  {* A triangular unit meant the divisin had 3 regiments; 337th, 338th, & 339th.  Each regiment had three battalions, consisting of four companies, each.}

   On February 21st {1943} Major General Haislip became the Commanding General, XV Army Corps, and Brigadier General John B. Coulter, the Assistant Division Commander, succeeded him as the Division Commander. On March 12th Brigadier General Coulter was promoted to the rank of Major General. On March 18th Colonel Lee S. Gerow was promoted to Brigadier General, and became the Assistant Division Commander.

A publicity shot of General John Coulter, commander of 85th Division throughout the War.

    Early in April the Division began its move to the maneuver area near Leesville, Louisiana. Here for 2 months the conditions of combat were simulated, division fighting against division much of the time. In June the Division had completed its training in this area, and then moved to Camp Pilot Knob, California, where it began still more arduous training in the Desert Training Center. In August the Division was moved to Camp Coxcomb, California where desert training was continued until October. This training was brought to an end by orders transferring the Division to Fort Dix, New Jersey, the last move before shipment overseas. At Camp Coxcomb, Brigadier General Pierre Mallett became Division Artillery Commander, succeeding Brigadier General Jay W. MacKelvie, who had been with the Division since its activation but was now transferred to the command of XII Corps Artillery. {The Division went desert training because the Allies were still fighting the Germans in North Africa.  Go to Desert Training Center for Map of these camps & history & photos.}

   At {Fort}Dix {NJ} the final preparations were made for entrance into combat. On December 16th the Advance Detachment of the Division set sail for Africa. A camp was established south of St. Denis Du Sig on the northern coast of Algeria, near Oran. The remainder of the Division sailed in December and January. By mid-January the entire Division had been assembled and was undertaking a program of intensive training in mountain warfare. Early in February the Division moved to Port-Aux-Poules for a period of amphibious training. While here the first orders were received to alert the units of the Division for movement to Italy. The 339th Regimental Combat Team was the first to be moved. Arriving in Italy on March 14th, it was attached to the 88th Infantry Division and became the first regiment of the Division to see combat in the present war. Shortly afterwards the other units of the Division reached Italy, landing at Naples, and the final preparations were made for the Division to go into the line near Minturno, about 40 miles to the north.
 

Members of a Heavey Weapons platoon with a 37mm gun at Camp Shelby.	For more history on Camp Shelby, go to Camp Shelby
A group photo taken at the Desert Training Center in California.	For more about the desert trainting, go to Desert Training Center

  At 8 o'clock on the morning of April 10th {1944}the Division was committed to action as a unit for the first time in its history. In the left sector of II Corps zone the Division took up position a few miles north of the Gargliano River along a low ridge of hills facing the Gustav Line. The front extended from the Ryrrhenian Sea on the sough, north along the low hills beyond Minturno to the Ausente River. The 339th Infantry (with Companies L and M of the 338th attached) moved up first to hold a front extending 5500 yards in from the sea, with 3 battalions abreast. By April 14th the 337th Infantry had taken over a 4000 yard front, on the right of the 339th, extending to the Ausente River. One platoon of the 85th Reconnaissance Troop was placed as a guard over the bridge across the Gargliano, about 2 miles southeast of Minturno on the site of the ancient town of the same name. All the traffic to our forward areas was obliged to use this bridge, which thereby became a point of vital importance to the Division. The remainder of the Troops patrolled the coast, on the watch for any attempts by the enemy to encircle the Division flank by an amphibious operation and to apprehend agents landing by boat. While holding these positions the Division prepared for the May offensive.

   The Tyrrhenian Coast runs west from Minturno and Scauri to Formia. About a mile beyond Scauri is the Croce Road Junction where the road south from Cassino joins Highway 7 about 6 miles above the Minturno Bridge. West of the Junction the Highway for 5 miles crosses a narrow plain, dominated by Monte Campese, to Formia where the mountains come down to the sea. At Formia the Gaeta Peninsula juts off to the south, but the Highway cuts sharply northwest across the mountains to Itri and Fondi, at the northern limit of the Fondi Plain. At Fondi the road turns southwest, crossing level plains for 5 or 6 miles. Then, skirting the mountains, it continues some 5 miles more to Terracina, built between high rocks and the sea.

   The Gustav Line was anchored on the beaches near Scauri and in the low hills rising from the Capo D'Acqua at the base of the Aurunci Mountains. Once the Gustave Line should be broken the efforts of the advance would ultimately be to secure Highway 7 as far as Terracina.

   The enemy -- consisting cheifly of elements of the German 94th Infantry Division -- was dug in along the western anchor of the Gustav Line. His positions extended from the coast near Scauri, north across the low hills of Colle San Martino, then northeast across the Solacciano Ridge to Santa Maria Infante. Between ours and the enemy's lines was a narrow grassy valley which was less than a half mile wide.

   Our troops were dispersed in fox-holes, behind rocks, and in buildings. Outposts were established a few hundred yards ahead of our forward positions. Some of these were used as waystations for the patrols as they went out and came back. Some had names -- "Ferdinand's," "Snuffy's", "Mother's Place."

   Every night for a month each battalion sent over one or more patrols, and on the basis of the patrol reports and aerial photographs taken from Cub planes and P-38s, we learned the location of many enemy positions. On this sector of the Gustav Line most of the enemy positions were on the reverse slopes of the hills. On the forward slopes there were minefields and wire barriers, placed in such a way that men advancing up the hills, feeling out the unobstructed passages, would come to points on the crest where they would be met by interlocking bands of fire from the machine guns in their positions on the reverse slopes. From the higher hills behind the first ridges the artillery, mortars and self-propelled guns were in position to blast at any of our troops coming down to attack the dug-in positions.

   Minturno, the Bridge, Tufo, and Tremensuoli received harassing fire regularly. The main street of Tremensuoli was nicknamed "Purple Heart Alley," and it is reported that troops stationed in Tremensuoli had figured out that a man could appear on that street for no more than 20 seconds before drawing fire.

   The important fact concerning the enemy's defenses in the coastal sector was that he expected an attack from the water. Along the beaches there were thousands of mines, dense barriers of concertina wire, concrete posts to block landing barges and tanks, and elaborate concrete pillboxes. Along the entire Gaeta Peninsula were batteries of coastal guns. Many of these defenses had been erected by the Italians and the Germans had added their improvements. But although the enemy's preparations to meet an attack from the sea were elaborate, it was soon to be found that the defenses of the Gustav Line were equally formidable.

   Through April and the early part of May the artillery supporting the Division fired constantly against enemy movements and artillery positions. From the very beginning the policy was established of firing about 5 rounds for every German shell. Our superiority in thei respect compelled the Germans to remain in their dugouts througout the day, restricting all their movements to the hours of darkness.

   The weather was fine. On the steep crags of the Petrella Mountain Mass to the north there was still snow, but around Minturno the valleys and hills were green with new growth.

   Mist sometimes settled down, and sometimes at night fog came in from the sea. But already the white dust was thick on the roads, not to be laid by rain till another autumn.

   On April 24th the 338th Infantry relieved the 339th along the coast, while that regiment took a short rest. Then, as plans for the attack matured, the 339th returned to the line to take the left half of the 338th sector in from the coast with 2 battalions in the line. Two battalions of the 338th now held approximately one half of their former regimental sector. The 337th Infantry was meanwhile relieved by elements of the 88th and became the Division reserve in an area southwest of Tremensuoli, except for the 3rd Battalion which was attached at this time to the 339th Infantry. Attached to the Division now were the 756th Tank Battalion, the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 5th Italian Mule Pack Group. The artillery remained under Division control and received direct support of the big guns of the Corps Artillery, as well as the entire 36th Division Artillery.

  Along the Division front the night of May 11th {1944} there was no moon and enough layers of mist in the upper air to obscure the stars. In the dark, along the entire line, from the Tyrrhenian Sea through Cassino to the Adriatic, men waited to attack.

   At 11 o'clock{pm} the great artillery barrage began. Long Toms, the great 240mm guns, 75mm pack howitzers, cannon, British 6 and 25 pounders, 105's, 155's, everything let go at that moment. For a full half-hour shells were poured into the German positions, tens of thousands of them. Almost nothing could be heard but the thunder of guns, and the air was lit up by the flashes of the powder charges. From the Minturno Hill, Scauri could be seen as it by daylight and in flashes they valley and the enemy's hills came into clear view out of the darkness.

The infantry moved up to the edges of the barrage. As the guns ceased firing, companies, platoons and squads advanced slowly into the fire that immediately met them.

          GO TO    Map 1 – Attack on Gustav Line -  May 12-14, 1944

On the right, the 338th moved out to attack the Solacciano Ridge. The 339th on the left attacked the Domenico Ridge, the low hills extending to its left, and Celle San Martino, made up of Hills 66 and 69. The enemy apparently did not expect an attack at this time, but after the initial surprise he recovered from the shock of the bombardment and held firm.

   What was beginning now was a bitter up-hill fight across exposed slopes, almost every move made under the eyes of the enemy. There could be no let-up in the assault once it had begun, and as we came to grips with the enemy in his closely-crowded positions the fighting went on without pause day and night.  It took time to get through the minefields before the dug-in positions could be reached, and in that time the enemy let go with his machine guns and mortars, covering every approach. A small stream, the Capo D'Acqua, proved one of the most bitter obstacles. Troops struggling through its current and up the steep banks which tanks could not climb advanced into the direct fire of machine guns and mortars "zeroed in" on them.

   Attacking towards the Solacciano Ridge, the 338th ran into fire from thick-walled farm houses the enemy had fortified, and in approaching these the troops made their way through the most densely laid minefields of all. Troops of I company drove the enemy from one of these houses, and waited while the artillery leveled a neighboring house occupied by the enemy. Then they took over the fortified positions in time to meet the reinforcements the Germans sent to take the houses back. Attacking in the draws a platoon of A Company lost man after man to machine gun fire until it was able to close in and destroy the enemy with hand grenades and bayonets.

   The 339th was meeting the same kind of fierce resistance. Advancing along the low hills of the Domenico Ridge, one platoon lost several of its members in the minefields and still others to machine gun fire. When the rest reached their objectives and dug in, the enemy counterattacked. Word was received by radio that our men were surrounded, and after that no messages came back. When the hill was recaptured 2 days later, the bodies of the leader and 5 of the men were found. At another point the bodies of most of the members of a platoon of B Company were found surrounded by 35 dead Germans.

   In the bitter fighting several companies were reduced to 50 or 60 percent of their strength. The reinforcement coming up through the minefields, which could be cleared only slowly and in the dark, suffered heavily from the mines and from artillery fire the enemy laid down to cut them off. The first ridges were to be taken only at heavy costs.

  The fighting was as brave as it was fierce. Company G, 339th Infantry was cited the the President for its outstanding performance of duty during this period. In advancing towards its objective, the Company took advantage of the artillery barrage to seize part of a hill before the barrage ceased. The 2 assault platoons, closing with the enemy before he could recover, killed 60 and captured 40 of their defenders, demolished 8 bunkers, reduced 7 pillboxes, and captured 25 automatic weapons. The objective taken, the company immediately used the enemy weapons to assist the assaults of adjacent companies. Meanwhile the company's own positions were pounded by artillery and mortar fire for 48 long hours. The enemy counterattacked 3 times, and was repulsed each time though our casualties were increasingly heavy and no reinforcements could be brought up. For 36 hours the men were without food or water, but they held out until the advance on other parts of the line made their position secure.

   It was in the first day's fighting that Lieutenant Robert T. Waugh, leader of the first platoon of this company{G}, engaged in the beginning of a series of actions that was to win him the Congressional Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry. He reconnoitered a minefield before entering it with his platoon, and then directing his men to fire against 6 bunkers, he advanced alone against one position after another. Reaching the first bunker, he threw phosphorous grenades into it, and as the defenders came running out he killed them with a burst from his tommy gun. Then he passed on to each of the remaining 5 bunkers, killing or capturing all of their occupants.

   The attack of the 3rd Battalion of the 339th Infantry against Hill 66 and Hill 69, the Colle San Martino, met perhaps the fiercest resistance of all. At the very beginning a squad of L Company was destroyed by artillery as it passed through Tremensuoli towards Hill 113 East. Following the trail out of the town still another squad was wiped out by the enemy artillery. But the remainder of the company and the battalion pushed on across the Capo D'Acqua to the slopes of Hill 69. Bitter fighting raged through the night as platoon after platoon moved up, but by 5 o'clock next morning the hill was captured.

   May 12th and 13th passed in an unceasing struggle. The gains were small, and fiercely won. Wherever we moved the enemy threw in heavy, accurate fire, and every break we made in his lines he tried to repair, counterattacking with all the strength he could collect. K Company of the 337th came up on the 12th to attack Hill 66, but by the time it reached the base of 69 it had suffered such heavy losses that it could not continue. It then dug in to reinforce the troops of 69. And at 9 o'clock that morning the nemy sent down 200 men and a tank to drive us out. He failed. But it was certain that still other attacks were being prepared and the need to capture Hill 66 became more urgent. So the 1st Battalion of the 337th was brought up under cover of a smoke screen to pass through the exhausted 3rd Battalion of the 339th. {For more details of the fighting and casualties on Hill 69, go to webpage on Biography of Private Patterson; a member of Company K, who was killed in action during this combat.}

           GO TO    Map 2 – From Minturno to Piverno & Sezze (Part 1) -  May 11- 28, 1944

   The fresh battalion pushed on slowly over Hill 69, and began its attack on Hill 66 at 4:30 the afternoon of the 12th. The enemy who had seen our troops advancing met them with such heavy fire that they were soon driven back. But the withdrawal was made only in order to reorganize. Twelve battalions of II Corps Artillery now laid down a barrage on 66, and the infantry moved out again at 6:30. The opposition was still stubborn, but the enemy soon had all he could take. Colle San Martino was captured, and our troops immediately consolidated their newly won positions.

   The next morning the enemy counterattacked. Fifty men firing machine pistols stormed the hill. They came within 50 yards of our positions unopposed. Then the order to fire was give, and every man of the enemy group was killed. Later others tried it again, and met the same results. Company C of the 337th Infantry received a Presidential Citation for its performance of duty in this action.

   On the 13th the enemy was counterattacking everywhere, and all along the line the men fought bitterly to hold their gains. And they continued to push slowly ahead. Gradually the sum of the gains became more important. By the morning of the 14th we held Hills 79 and 69 and several positions on the Solacciano Ridge. Troops were ready to move into Scauri. It now remained to reorganize for the final breakthrough. The 2nd Battalion of the 337th came up to attack between the 338th and 339th. On the afternoon of the 14th supported by tanks, they attacked Hill 108, overrunning it and taking more than 80 prisoners and the 338th was clearing the last enemy resistance on the Solacciano Ridge.

   By noon of the 15th the 339th was holding Hills 66, 79 and 58; the newly committed 2nd Battalion of the 338th had captured the Cave D'Argilla area; and the 337th was on 108. The last counterattacks had been beaten off. The Gustav Line was broken. The drive which was to secure Highway 7 to Terracina was now to begin.

  The coordinated Division attack began on the afternoon of May 15th. The enemy had a secondary line between Castellonorato and Scauri, and the Division prepared to attack before the enemy had time to get set. The 338th Infantry was ordered to strike wet to seize Monte Penitro, then to drive southwest to the Croce Road Junction and on to Highway 7. If successful this attack would by-pass Scauri and Monte Scauri on the jut of land west of the Highway. On the right the 337th Infantry was ordered to seize Castellonorato, and then push west along the mountain road to Maranola, a distance of about 5 miles, prepared to turn south there, following the road leading to Highway 7 just below Formia.

   By this time the 88^th Division on the right, with the assistance of the 338th Infantry, had reduced the important enemy strong-point in Santa Maria Infante. In order to coordinate the advance of the 2 division the 349th Infantry Regiment of the 88th Division was now attached to the 85th. Attacking west form La Civita, on the mountains north of Castellonorato, this regiment was ordered to strike due west across the roadless mountains parallel to the advance of the 337th.

   The enemy apparently relied on the extremely rugged, mountainous country to hold up our advance. He had neglected to construct any considerable number of defenses, though hasty positions served him well, and from the positions on Monte Campese and with the support of guns on the Gaeta Peninsula he was attempting to cover the withdrawal of his troops to Formia. Guns on Monte Penitro and Tripoli were being used to delay the advance of our troops on Castellonorato and beyond. { My father reported he obtained the German camera in Formia on May 15^th.  Refer to Photos from the Italian Front for photos and story about this camera.}

   There was little attempt to defend the first hills. The 3^rd Battalion of the 337th Infantry, relieved from attachment to the 339th, and shifting over to take up positions on the left of the 2nd Battalion, came under fire from Monte Penitro, but they went on, the companies in lines of squad columns, and Castellonorato was captured by dark. The enemy was now withdrawing all along the line. He abandoned Monte Scauri when our seizure on the 16th the 339th moved into the town of Scauri and cleaned out a few delaying positions on Monte Scauri.

   Advancing from Penitro towards the Croce Road Junction the 338th Infantry washeld up by the last counterattack in this area. The enemy was trying to save the remnants of his forces now deeply outflanked by the 88th Division driving west across the mountains north of the Formia corridor. By this time the 94th Division had been reduced to approximately 1200 men and to save these the enemy threw in a battalion of impressed foreign laborers and some troops from the 274th Grenadier Regiment, attacking from the banks of the Aquatraversa stream. He also brought to bear concentrated artillery fire from Monte Campese and Gaeta. This held the regiment up during the 16th, but by the end of the day that resistance was also overcome.

   On the 16th, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 337th advanced to the west beyond Castellonorao, crossing the Aquatraversa, and moving towards Maranola. One company of the 3rd Battalion, as it came close to Monte Campese, received heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire. Its troops then dug in at the base, awaiting the arrival of the remaining companies who also dug in before renewing the attack. But next morning they found that the bulk of the enemy had withdrawn. It only remained for the 3rd Battalion to clear the pillboxes and sniper posts on the heights while the 2nd went on to capture Trivio and Marnola.

  The enemy resistance had now cracked everywhere. The enemy had neither the fores nor the time to establish a line in front of the Division. Elsewhere he had also been defeated. The last desperate resistance on the central Italian front at Cassino was to be wiped out on the 18^th, and on the west the final push was under way to join with the forces from Anzio Beachhead. On May 16th the 85th Division was placed on a 72-hour alert, prepared to move to Anzio by water, but is soon appeared that the joining of the forces would be achieved sooner than had been originally expected. The final decision was that the Division would continue its drive towards Terracina.
{The amphibious landing at Anzio in January 1944 was supposed to relieve the pressure off the Cassino front.  However, the Germans resistance kept the British and Americans confined until spring.  The Allied commanders came close to pulling the troops out of Anzio.}

   Now that Campese was taken, the last major obstacles in the advance of the 338th on Formia had been removed. On the 17th the regiment advanced into the town,cleaning out the little remaining resistance the next day. Late in the night of the 18^th the regiment moved out of Formia to capture Monte Conca. In doing this they opened the road to Itra, and arrived at positions in the rear of the enemy defenses on the Gaeta Peninsula. On the 19th the 338th Infantry and the 85th Reconnaissance Troop cleared out a few pockets of resistance in the Peninsula with little difficulty, and troops entered the town unmolested. The enemy's next refuge was the so-called Hitler Line, anchored at Terracina.

   The 339th Infantry had now come up from the vicinity of Scauri along the Highway to Formia, where it began to advance along the Highway to Itri. Seizing mountains on the left of the road--Monte Cefalo and Monte San Onofino--the regiment was for a time harassed by fire coming from Itri. The 2nd Battalion was dispatched to clear the enemy forces from a section of the town, and accomplished its mission in short order.

   In Formia, Gaeta and Itri the enemy had left a large amount of valuable equipment behind, and it was apparent that he had been forced to withdraw in haste. Along the roads there began to appear the debris of a defeated enemy --unpacked boxes of ammunition, unlaid mines, discarded gas masks. Later there was to be the much more impressive litter of a rout, but now ere the first signs of a serious defeat.

  At this time a pursuit force was organized to hound the retreating Germans. The 2^nd Battalion of the 337th Infantry was motorized, operating with a company of tanks, a platoon of the 85th Reconnaissance Troop and a platoon of engineers. This force detrucked at Itri, and moved over to the base of Monte Cefalo where it prepared to attack Monte San Biagio which descends to the northern edge of Highway 7 at the Fondi Plain. The remainder of the regiment went into a reserve status for a brief period.

   The 339th Infantry now began an arduous advance from the vicinity of Fondi, lately captured by elements of the 88th Division, crossing steep, almost trailless mountains north to Sonnino, a distance of 12 miles. The troops struck out across this rocky country, following the compass, and their supplies were brought to them by mules and by men carrying rations and ammunition on their backs.

   The regiment possessed almost no knowledge of the enemy's dispositions in this area, and contact with the Germans was temporarily lost. The 94th Division was nevertheless known to be in desperate need of reinforcement as it retreated in to the mountains north of Fondi and along the Highway to Terracina.

   Between San Biagio and Sonnino there were 3 mountains in a direct line, each more than 1500 feet high. The 1^st Battalion moved ahead first in the advance on Sonnino. The 2^nd following the 1^st was obliged to clear out several enemy bands as it climbed the high ground overlooking Highway 7, and its advance went slowly. It was not before the morning of the 23^rd that all these pockets had been cleaned up. Shortly before noon of that day the 1^st Battalion had come into positions for the attack on Sonnino, but before the 2^nd Battalion had come abreast of it enemy anti-aircraft guns opened up on both battalions. As our own artillery had been outdistanced it could not lend support to our infantry. Nevertheless, preparations for the attack continued, the 2^nd Battalion took positions on high ground from which it could lend supporting fire, the 3^rd Battalion by now had joined the 1^st, and the attack jumped off at half-past four. The advance went ahead steadily, and after 2 hours' fighting the town was ours. In addition to killed, the enemy lost 73 men as prisoners. One of these was the commander of the 3^rd Battalion of the 15^th Panzer Grenadier Regiment who said that our troops had not been expected to cross over the mountains and that the first intimation he had had of our presence was when he suddenly received a message that he Americans were on both flanks and that retreat was impossible. {Typo? Maybe 16th Panzer Greadier Regiment.}

   Meanwhile, on May 21^st, the 337^th Infantry had been recommitted, and, passing to the rear of the 339th, advanced on the left flank of that regiment to take Monte San Biagio, where it found little resistance though it captured a considerable number of prisoners.

   The 338th had enjoyed a short rest after mopping up Gaeta. Billeted briefly in what remained of the villas along the coast, the troops had a chance to swim in the salt water, get a change of clothes, and replace damaged equipment. On May 21st, however, orders were received to move on to take positions west of Fondi to begin the advance on Terracina.

  Highway 7 is the single road serving several of the II Corps units, and from the Croce Road Junction on there was a solid mass of traffic. The long lines of supply trucks and artillery, the battalions of foot troops, the tanks, the reconnaissance cars, the liaison jeeps, all created the picture of a great military action and its vast momentum. Partly to avoid delays caused by the road traffic, the 1st Battalion of the 338th moved by water in DUKW's (two-and-a-half ton amphibious trucks) to Sperlonga, about 12 miles west of Gaeta. They were prepared to find enemy on the beach, but when they arrived they discovered that the Germans had already pulled out, and the battalion proceeded immediately by DUKW and on foot to join the remainder of the regiment near Fondi.

   In the meantime the 337th Infantry was crossing the mountains and following the highway southwest towards Terracina. Along the entire Division front the enemy resistance stiffened as the strength of th eGerman reinforcements made itself felt. Both the 337th and 339th Regiments were now encountering troops of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and still other forces hastily withdrawn from Anzio and thrown into the defense of Terracina.

   Pushing over the mountains northwest of that city the 337^th Infantry captured Monte Autone and Monte Copiccio on May 21st after much weary climbing. By taking these positions they cleared a long stretch of Highway 7 and the 1st Battalion, with strong armor support, now moved down the Highway until they ran into heavy fire covering the defile between San Angelo and the sea. Several truckloads of enemy troops had been rushed to the end of the Terracina Aqueduct, where they occupied prepared positions. Here the fire from small arms and mortars stopped further passage along the road.

   Troops and trucks were lined up in the bright daylight waiting for the artillery to be brought up to wipe out the resistance. The enemy guns had already been pulled out as had most of his mortars, and the advancing forces halted just out of range of small arms fire, where the enemy could see them but could do little. When heavier guns were brought up, the Germans were put to flight and the advance continued.

   Further, more serious opposition was met on the outskirts of Terracina. The point of the march column was within 500 yards of the city when the enemy opened up on it with automatic small arms fire. The beach on the left of the road was known to be mined and on the right the enemy had dug in on the steep bluffs. Tanks were sent ahead, but these were halted by a crater road block. There was nothing to do for the moment but withdraw, and the battalion now took up positions on the northern and forward slopes of Monte Croce.

   When the sun came up in the morning the troops discovered that the crest of the mountain was held by large groups of enemy. Throughout most of the day the battalion was pinned down by fire from here and by numbers of roving snipers with machine pistols. The snipers were disposed of by patrols, and in the late afternoon the battalion moved to the reverse slopes of the mountain where the enemy in his fixed positions could not reach them. A rolling barrage was called for, covering the crest of the mountain yard by yard, and in a short time the positions on Croce were wiped out.

   The 3^rd Battalion, coming up along the right of the 1^st, had also been troubled by fire coming from Monte Croce. Climbing through heavy brush on the steep slopes of Monte Stefano, they were supplied only by mules and hand carry. But during the night of the 22^nd and the early morning of the 23^rd the heavy weapons elements were brought up, and the battalion moved forward over the rocks, firing every weapon it possessed against the strong points on the slopes of Croce opposite them. When the enemy was finally wiped out by the artillery, the 3^rd Battalion had reached positions from which it could overlook Terracina. Meanwhile the 2^nd Battalion had moved through the 1st, prepared for a coordinated attack on Terracina with the 3^rd Battalion on the morning of the 23^rd.

     GO TO       Map 3 –  From Minturno to Piverno & Sezze (Part 2) -  May 11- 28, 1944

  The battle for Terracina developed into a battle for the cemetery on the outskirts of the city. This cemetery was on high ground and the approaches were rocky and steep. A light rain had made the slopes slippery and this hindered the tanks, bu texcellent close support was rendered the infantry by several battalion of self-propelled 105's* belonging to the 6th Field Artillery Group. In the cemetery the enemy had dug in beneath the tombs. Machine guns, mortars and snipers were using the monuments for cover. The battle raged the entire day, but just before dark the last enemy resistance had been overcome, and by midnight the 2^nd and 3^rd Battalions had taken up positions on the edge of the town. *{105's - This self-propelled gun was a 105-mm howitzer mounted on a mobile, armored car.  The term, "self-propelled gun", generally refered to an artillery gun mounted on a tank chasis that didn't have a transversing turrent. }

   Meanwhile the 1^st Battalion had reorganized and moved over on the right to the northwest of Terracina. All during the night our artillery fired into the roads leading to the north, and what was left of the once beautiful city crumbled. After dawn the battalions moved easily into the town. The bottleneck, Terracina, was captured, and the road to the Anzio Beachhead was opened.

   To assist the fighting around Terracina the 338^th Regiment had been ordered on the 22^nd to move out and capture the mountains on the right of the 337^th in order to outflank that city. At the beginning of the advance a brief encounter occurred at the southern end of a 5-mile long railroad tunnel. The Germans used this tunnel as a protected route of supply and evacuation and through it had been coming some of the badly needed reinforcements. Emerging from the tunnel and preparing positions these troops were surprised by our advancing forces. After our supporting air units had blocked the northern end of the tunnel by bombing, tank destroyers and reconnaissance troop weapons fired directly into the mouth of the tunnel. Stories of what happened here spread everywhere, and were multiplied in the telling. The essential point was that the tunnel was no longer of any use to the Germans. After this initial engagement the 3rd Battalion of the 338th Infantry, reinforced by elements of the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion, remained on guard near the tunnel to make certain that none of the enemy escaped, and other elements of the regiment went on to capture Monte Leano and Monte Nero with little difficulty.

   The enemy was now withdrawing from Terracina along the Highway on the edge of the Pontine Marshes, which he had flooded, and beyond Sonnino he was withdrawing northwest across the Amaseno River. The pursuit continued.

   Our advancing troops now saw more and more of the results of the work done by the artillery and the air forces. The Germans had been compelled to give up their policy of moving only at night, and in their need of getting out they had taken to the roads in daylight despite our overwhelming air superiority. This decision perhaps saved them from complete destruction, but it was nevertheless a ruinous escape. Burnt out trucks and tanks were everywhere, abandoned spiked artillery, ammunition dumps, and the bodies they had not had time to bury.

   The problem now was to keep contact with the enemy. Dismembered and defeated, his organization fell apart, and the signs of confusion spread everywhere. By May 26th it seemed that almost all traces of a coherent organization had disappeared. Instead of fighting by platoons, companies and battalions, the enemy now threw together so-called "Battle Groups," miscellaneous troops gathered wherever they could be found, put under an officer or an NCO and thrown into the line. Since May 22^nd the enemy had had almost no artillery support. His scattered foot troops received only the occasional aid of self-propelled guns and a few machine guns hastily dug in in pockets of hills. Contact was consequently maintained only with a few delaying forces.

   The Division now pressed forward with all possible speed in the hills north of the Pontine Marshes. During the 25^th and 26^th it had advanced west of the Abbe di Fossanuova and Priverno. At this time the 338^th was marching in a column of battalions, meeting practically no resistance until it arrived at an impromptu enemy line in the hills east and northeast of Sezze. Monte Trevi was quickly seized, and the last resistance in Sezze was mopped up by elements of the regiment after the town had been entered by troops of the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron. The 338th Infantry was advancing northwest towards Monte San Angelo, when on the 27^th it was relieved by the 351st Infantry Regiment of the 88th Division.

   By now forces pushing out from Anzio Beachhead had joined with other Allied units coming from the east. As a result the 85^th Division had been "pinched out." After 49 days' continuous service in the line the Division passed to reserve, moving to Sabaudia, formerly a resort on the coast below Anzio.

   Between May 11^th and 28^th the Division had broken the Gustav Line and driven the enemy before it 45 miles over a long series of rugged mountains. It had routed the Germans, destroyed enormous amounts of equipment, and had taken 1173 prisoners. Victory was in the air.

THE DRIVE ON ROME AND TO THE NORTH

  Along the entire front the advance of the Allies was rapidly accelerating. The enemy was on the point of rout, and the pressure of the pursuit needed to be intensified; Rome and the destruction of the enemy were almost realized objectives. Accordingly, orders were now given to move the Division north. east to the Lariano-Guilianello sector. The Division took up its new sector on May 30th.

   In Lariano and the hills to the north the enemy still manned a defensive line. In positions here the famous Hermann Goering Panzer Grenadier Division hoped to delay our advance sufficiently to permit the escape of other troops along the roads. While the positions they held in the vicinity of Lariano, though few, were well prepared, beyond that locality the Germans were compelled to erect only the hastiest kind of field fortifications, hurriedly cutting down trees to clear fields of fire and to provide tank barriers.   {Hermann Goering Division - an elite panzer division formed from the Luftwaffe.  In the 1930's, Herman Goering was chief of Police and he formed a police brigade that bore his name.  As this unit grew, it became an anti-aircraft unit for Hitler's Wolf Lair and then a regiment and eventually a panzer division. The literal translation of their name was 'paratrooper tank division'. It served in Sicily and in Italy until its departure in July 1944.}

   But now the sense of conquest had grown stronger among the troops, and every step meant that Rome was that much closer. There was still the ugly job of destroying the snipers lurking in the brush and woods, the machine guns placed in the railroad cuts, and still at night the occasional German planes came over to harass the troops. But miles now were being covered each day, and the advance was accelerated. The service companies and the rear command posts had more and more difficulty in keeping up with the troops. The weather continued bright, and clear. Everywhere the trees were growing greener- poppies were thick in the fields, and around Cori the cherries were ripe.

   The new Division sector lay between 2 great highways leading to Rome. About 5 miles north of Lariano Highway 6, from Cassino, came into Rome from a southeasterly direction. About 4 miles west of Lariano was Highway 7, leading to Rome from the south. The route of the Division advance lay across a region crowded with steep rocky hills till it reached the Tiber Valley, and Rome itself, some 23 miles distant. Much of the region was heavily wooded with pines and chestnut trees, and many of the hills bore the now familiar terraces on which olive orchards and vineyards were planted.

   The 337^th and 338^th Infantry Regiments had relieved elements of the 3rd American Division {actually called 3rd 'Marne' Division}, and the Division Artillery was brought up to take positions in support of the infantry. At 1 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31st the attack began. The 1st Battalion of the 337^th on the right and the 3rd on the left advanced on either side of Lariano, by-passing the town. The 2nd Battalion sent a reinforced company into Lariano to wipe out the rear guard there, which it accomplished only after a bitter, prolonged fight.

   The 3rd Battalion was now moving along a front slightly less than a mile wide, down the slopes of a ridge thickly covered with rows of vineyards. The advance went slowly, but one company in the early evening had reached the opposite slope and consolidated positions there.

   On June 1st the 338^th Infantry, advancing north of Lariano, overcame stubborn resistance in the morning but late in the day the enemy resistance failed, and the signs of withdrawal were unmistakable.

  That midnight the regiment was relieved by the 351st Infantry Regiment of the 88th Division. but when it was seen that the enemy retreat was about to turn into a rout the 338^th was recommitted immediately to pursue the badly beaten remnants of the Goering Division. On the night of June 2nd the battalion entered San Cesareo and cut Highway 6, killing a large number of Germans who were trying to escape along the road. At this point the regiment passed to Division reserve except for the 3rd Battalion which was attached to the 339^th Infantry to become the reserve battalion for that regiment.

   The 339^th Infantry, passing through Giulianello on June 1st, attacked through thickly wooded hills to seize Castel D'Ariano, the highest point of the Maschio D'Ariano Hill Mass. Progress was steady and quick for several miles, the only resistance fire from snipers and an occasional self-propelled gun. But the next day, as the regiment veered to the northwest, it met resistance from mortars and artillery on Monte Fiore, southwest of Rocca Priora. But this resistance was reduced in short order, and on June 3rd the regiment seized 2 more hills, Monte Salamone and Monte San Sebastiano.

Just south of Monte Compatri the 85^th Reconnaissance Troop ran into a heavy fire fight the night of June 3rd, in which they killed 40 of the enemy and took 65 prisoners. The next day elements of the Troop cleared Frascati of snipers. The 339th Infantry occupied the town somewhat later, and went on to advance to within 3 miles of Rome when it halted for the night.

   The 337^th Infantry continued to meet heavy resistance. Through the thickly wooded draws motorized patrols and roving snipers harassed the troops, and several times wedges were driven into the exposed right flank of the 1st Battalion. At one time the infiltrating enemy completely surrounded the 1st Battalion CP, and it was necessary to round up every available man to scout out and kill the enemy. Tank destroyers were meanwhile brought up to aid the 3^rd Battalion, tanks were aiding the 1^st, and now hill after hill fell into our hands.

   In this sector resistance was still stiff. The enemy did not want to give in. But by nightfall of June 2nd the troops had pushed through to seize Monte Ceraso, and the 2nd Battalion had reached a point only 1200 yards south of Highway 6. By this time they were more than 2 miles in advance of the rest of the line.

On June 3rd new orders changed the direction of the regiment's advance from north to northwest. By now contact was lost with the enemy, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions, in approach march formations, moved west on parallel roads. After an interval the 2nd passed through the 1stto capture Monte Compatri without much trouble. Some light resistance was met before Monte Porzio Catone was taken, but this was soon wiped out.

  Before us now lay the Tiber, and in the early morning the domes of the churches of Rome could be clearly seen, the first sight of the beautiful prize of weeks of hard fighting. In the warm sunlight of May the city seemed to be waiting for the troops to enter it.

   One company of the 3rd Battalion of the 337^th, motorized and reinforced as a task force, supported by tanks, tank destroyers. engineers and artillery, was now ordered to advance along Highway 6 into Rome and to seize and protect 2 bridges across the Tiber west of Rome. The I and R Platoon, preceding the advance, had reached the suburbs of Rome by half-past eight the morning of June 4th, the first troops of the Division to reach that city.   { There is much discussion as to which American unit can claim to be the first to enter Rome.  I agree with accounts that say the Recon Troop of the 88th Division was first.  The noted time may be a clue.}

   At the city limits the task force was held up by an armored unit engaged in wiping out an enemy strongpoint along the road, and while here orders were received again changing the mission of the regiment. The 337th was ordered to turn south- -west to take up a defensive position' astride Highway 7 about 4 miles out of Rome, and to prevent any further enemy withdrawal by that route. Pressing ahead through the traffic congestion of VI Corp troops speeding along the highway into Rome the regiment cut the highway. This move was in large part responsible for the capture of 743 prisoners taken by the Division in the 24-hour period from noon to noon 4th - 5th June. In marching from Frascati to Rome the 3rd Battalion, 338th Infantry accounted for 300prisoners.

   A task force composed of the 2nd Battalion of. the 338^th Infantry, reinforced by tanks, tank destroyers, and engineers, was sent into Rome on June 4th to secure 3 ridges across the Tiber in that city. Preceded by the regimental I and R Platoon, this force entered Rome in the middle of the afternoon, and by nightfall had reached their objectives, which, however, were already guarded by a Special Service Force whom they later relieved.
 

GO TO     Map 4 – The Drive Beyond Rome  -  June 4 – 10, 1944

   June 5th saw the advance of the Division through Rome. Entry into a conquered capitol must always be one of the greatest experiences a soldier may know. Everywhere the people ran out into the streets to hug and kiss and shake hands with the marching soldiers, shouting and cheering. They ran beside the jeeps and trucks, chattering and laughing unrestrainedly, throwing flowers, waving their hands, and some of them pathetically saluting in the Fascist manner. It was a spontaneous, happy welcome.

   On June 5th the 339^th Infantry passed through the city and along Highway 2 to a bivouac area northwest of Rome. The 338^th and 337^th Regiments followed, and the pursuit was continued.

   Following along Highway 2 to the northwest towards Viterbo and the Lago di Bracciano there were more and more of the signs of the routed Germans - burnt out and abandoned wreckage everywhere - though here it appeared that the enemy had had no time to wreck his own equipment. The Germans had fled in everything they could lay their hands on, ambulance, trucks, Italian omnibuses, motorcycles, and bicycles.

   North of Rome Highway 2 wound through gentle rolling country, rich pasture land, well tended olive vineyards, and a few patches of woods. At some places a hill or a bluff offered the enemy the opportunity to set up a number of delaying positions, and snipers were still found in the haystacks. But more often than not contact was lost with the enemy these first days above Rome. The Germans were now retreating towards the Arno as fast as they could travel.

   The 339^th Infantry had pursued the enemy beyond Olgiata when it passed to reserve. The other 2 regiments took up the chase, passing through the 339^th.   These were organized as combat teams, each with a company of tanks, a company of tank destroyers and a platoon of the 85^th Reconnaissance Troop attached. On June 7th the Howze Task Forcewas attached to the Division, and this fast armored unit, with the 1st Battalion of the 337^th Infantry attached, drove ahead to give the enemy no chance to pause.

   These forces met small groups left behind to man a few self-propelled guns, some groups in armored cars and firing automatic weapons made harassing raids, and here and there a machine gun made a short stand. Near Monterosi the approaches to the village were mined, but nothing was more indicative of the enemy's haste and his inability to organize any substantial delaying action than his failure to lay extensive minefields.

    Each day the prisoners were taken in droves, the confused, isolated remnants of the rout. Among these were members of a cooks and bakers school the enemy had seen fit to give rifles and orders to delay and hinder our advance. In the great mixture of forces left behind in the rout were parts of the 20^th German Air Force Division and the 4^th Parachute Division, the latter to be our first opponent on the Gothic Line. { 20th German Air Force Division was one of 2 infantry divisions made up of air force personel.  By 1943, the Luftwaffe was ineffective and personel were transferred into twenty-one divisions.  The 19th and 20th LFD served in Italy.  Officially known as Luftwaffe Field Division.}

  But now the Divisions part in driving the enemy north was coming to a pause. On June 10th the Division was relieved from the line some 46 miles beyond Rome. Since April 10th it had been in action 60 out of 62 days. Since May 11th it had advanced 135 miles, breaking the Gustav Line, opening the road to the Anzio Beachhead, and playing an important part in the capture of Rome. It had virtually destroyed the German 94th Division and cut up much of the 29th and the Goering Panzer Grenadier Divisions. From these units and all the other scrambled organizations of the enemy it had taken 2461 prisoners.

   Now had come the time for a rest.

  Beyond the Gothic Line the Germans had no line of prepared defenses to fall back on before the Po Valley. But between Il Giogo and the Valley were nearly 40 miles of mountains, including a ridge in itself as formidable as the watershed. As time went on and the Appennines began to appear endless, it seemed tbat the entire mountain range to the north might be called the Gothic Line. Whatever the name, it blocked the way to the Po Valley, and it was towards that region that the Allies were now attacking.

  In pleasing contrast with the first days, the advance was now progressing with what seemed remarkable speed: the gains were measured in thousands instead of single yards, and as much as 2 miles were covered in one day. The enemy was at first disorganized, but soon he began to make use of nearly every advantage the terrain offered, and reinforcements were coming down. Elements of the 362nd "Greiner" Division now made their appearance on our front, as well as miscellaneous units of the 715th Infantry Division. During the rest of the month the chief resistance was to be offered by the 362nd Divisionand the Lehr Brigade. The Parachute unit that had first opposed us was not now encountered in this sector. {German 715th Infantry Division was formed as a security and costal defense unit in May 1941.  It arrived in Italy in January 1944 and participated in the defense of Anzio.   In September 1944 it was assigned to the X Army, oposing the British 8th Army. In February of 1945, the division was transfered to the Eastern Front.}

  As the 338^th moved towards Firenzoula 6 miles to the north, they were subjected to more and more artillery and mortar fire, but they pushed steadily ahead across the hills and down into the Santerno Valley. Firenzuola was captured on the 21^st after the Santerno River had been crossed to the east. When our troops entered it, Firenzuola was already a badly shelled and bombed town. For several days further it was to receive heavy shelling from the enemy, and when it was finally left by the war the once attractive town was almost uninhabitable. Beyond Firenzuola there were no other towns any size in the Division sector south of the Po Valley.

  Beyond the Santerno the first severe resistance was encountered on Monte Coloreta, on the right. This mountain, more than 3000 feet high, sprawled over a large area. The 339th Infantry advanced towards this objective on September 20th, supported by tanks and tank destroyers. Elements of the 1stt Battalion were the first to reach its slopes, digging in on the night of the 21st, but the enemy was not cleared from the mountain till the next the day. On the left the 338th was meeting small, persistent attacking groups, and it was in an engagement in this region that First Lieutenant Orville E. Bloch performed actions that earned for him the Congressional Medal of Honor. On September 22nd E Company of the 338th Infantry was held up by heavy machine gun fire from the crest of Hill 733, northeast of Firenzuola. Lieutenant Bloch asked for 3 volunteers from his platoon to provide him covering fire while he went forward to engage the enemy singlehanded. In and near several houses beyond the crest of the hill the enemy had placed machine guns. Advancing from behind a rock near the crest Lieutenant Bloch engaged one enemy position after another, killing and capturing several Germans. The prisoners he sent back by the men covering his assault. In all he silenced 5 machine guns, killed an unknown number of the enemy, wounded 6, and took 19 as prisoners. When this had been accomplished, his company was able to continue its advance, and without the losses that might otherwise have been suffered.

  The Division now moved steadily ahead over the increasingly rugged hills towards Monte La Fine, on the right, and Monte Canda, about 4 miles to the northwest of Coloreta. Instead of attacking towards the steep, south slopes of Canda, the drive was to be made to the north, past the eastern slopes of the mass, to seize the mountain to the north, Tre Poggioli (Hill 966), including the Zanobi rock. From here forces would be sent southwest to clear the by-passed Canda.

  The enemy had prepared positions to thwart such a move. The small village of Sambuco and the Ravignana Heights to the north had been chosen as the center of resistance to block an advance on Tre Poggioli. Sambuco, a cluster of small, thick-walled stone houses, lay in a pocket among several hills and gullies, reached by only the poorest roads. The village was encircled by machine guns, which were well dug in, and machine guns in the town were placed to fire from the windows of barricaded houses. Only after 2 days of repeated attacks, and close-in fighting supported by tanks, was the village captured by reinforced elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 338th Infantry. While the fight for Sambuco was raging, other forces were gathering for an attack on the Ravignana Heights to the north and on Tre Poggioli. From the vicinity of La Fine, which had been occupied by the 337th, the advance towards these objectives began on the 25th. After the 3rd Battalion of the 338th had run into difficulties, the 1st Battalion of that regiment joined with the 1st Battalion of the 339th to continue the attack.

  The enemy was resisting from Tre Poggioli and from high ground to the west and south. His 75mm and 105mm self-propelled guns were concentrated against our supporting tanks. But after climbing over the barren, shelterless terrain the tanks moved across the path of the advancing infantry and cut the road leading southwest to Canda. This move compelled the enemy on Canda to begin withdrawing to the north immediately. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 339th had seized the Ravignana Heights, and the way was clear for the final attack on Tre Poggioli.

  The tanks moved up behind an artillery barrage, and the infantry came abreast of them, fired on by the enemy artillery still remaining on Canda. On Tre Poggioli machine guns and snipers commanded unobstructed fields of fire over the bare slopes. But by noon our first troops had reached the crest, and shortly afterwards the enemy was cleared from the entire mass.

  The mud bad recently been hampering operations considerably, and conditions were no better in the area between Tre Poggioli and Canda. As the 3rd Battalion of the 338th moved up from Casa Buraccia to attack Canda from the northeast, the march through the dark and mud and chilling rain was dreary and difficult. It turned out that the greatest resistance was offered by the terrain. As the battalion moved towards Canda on the morning of the 28th, it met only light resistance on the beginning slopes. The enemy had left a few troops on the northeast of the mountain, but these were quickly cleaned out. The crest, which our troops reached at noon, was deserted.

  The last ridge of the Appennines had been conquered, and the Division now began the advance across the range of lower hills eventually descending to the Po Valley 20 miles to the north. The Division sector included the ridge of hills between 2 mountain streams, the Torrente Sillaro on the east and the Torrente Idice on the west. For a considerable distance it also included the slopes rising from the east bank of the Sillaro and a somewhat wider section of the ridge sloping down to the Idice from the west. The streams were now rivers rushing with water drained from the barren hills.

  In the operations to come the infantry was to attack across hills and ridges overlooking these valleys, slowly clearing the enemy from the villages on hill crests or in pockets in the bills. In a few miles they would reach several mountain masses - - - Bibele, Formiche, and Monterenzio - which dominated the smaller, nearby hills and the valleys. About 5 miles beyond these the last range of dominating hills before the Po Valley stretched across the Division sector - Monte Fano, Castelvecchio and Monte Castellaro. Later, when the direction of the attack shifted northeast, other masses of this range would be included among the Division's objectives.

  Valley roads followed the Idice and Sillaro Torrents, winding back and forth. These were normally good roads, but in this season they were deep in the mud that was sliding down from the hills.

  The bridges crossing the rivers were usually demolished by the time we reached them, and the engineers were constantly called on to construct new bridges. In one stretch of less than 7 miles it was necessary to throw 9 Bailey Bridges across the Idice. The valley roads were served by a few connecting toads and trails, but in the greatest part of these hills there were no roads of any use to the troops. Mules, usually with American leaders and Italian skinners, made the advance possible. As it was, in many places it proved necessary to bring up supplies on the backs of men.

  The enemy continued his delaying tactic, fortifying houses and villages, digging in machine gun positions on dominating points. From concealed positions his self-propelled guns and tanks fired against our advancing troops and against positions we had recently won, ready to join in the counter-attacks which he continued to make regularly. At the end of September the German forces opposing the Division included elements of the 44th Infantry Division on the east, and elements of the 362nd Infantry Division and the Lehr Brigade to the west. Later on these units were replaced by other, fresher troops. {German 44th Infantry Division participated in the invasions of Poland, France and Russia. At Stalingrad in 1942, it ceased to exist.  It was reformed with the honorary title, "Reichs-Grenadier-Division Hoch und Deutschmeister" in recognition of its "heroic performance" in combat. In February 1945, the division left Italy for Hungary.}

  After the capture of Canda on September 28th rain in downpours temporarily delayed the advance. Patrols were sent out ahead to maintain contact with the withdrawing enemy, and on September 30th orders were issued for the continuance of the attack at 6 o'clock on the morning of October 1st, the 337th Infantry on the right, the 339th on the left. The 338th was ternporarily in reserve. At this time the 85th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the 337th Infantry, and from now until October 14th it held positions protecting that regiment's right flank.

  The 337^th's first objectives were Casoni di Romagna near the summit of Hill 751 and the hill itself, about 2-1/2 miles to the northeast, and the Villa di Sassonero, a mile farther north and just west of the Sillaro. The 339th was to cut northwest to advance along both sides of the Idice Torrent towards Monte Bibele, rising from the west bank of that river 4 miles to the north. Both regiments soon ran into stiff resistance. Tanks could not climb through the mud and up the steep, cliff-like slopes on the extreme right, and on the left the enemy had fortified a succession of small villages to block our way to the Idice Valley road.

  Moving to another sector our tanks made their way to engage the enemy's armor, and the Spedaletto Ridge was captured by F Company, 337th Infantry after infantry riding a platoon of tanks had gone ahead to clear the way. Some of the heaviest fighting in the 339th sector centered about the village of La Martina. The enemy was already sending down more troops and tanks to reinforce his garrisons in the fortified villages. The 3rd Battalion was attacking on the right of the 2^nd, supported by 6 tanks and 8 tank-destroyers. This action pierced an enemy defense line which included La Martina, and whose existence was learned from a captured enemy document.

  In the mud and rain the advance went slowly ahead. Casoni di Romagna fell to a surprise attack by the 337th on October 2nd, and once the Idice Valley road was gained the 339th progressed steadily along both sides of the river until by October 4th it had reached positions from which it could begin the attack on Monte Bibele.

  From the southwest a ridge led from the village of Quinzano to the summit of Bibele, and this offered the most suitable approach. From Quinzano, whose row of houses stretched along high ground, the enemy dominated the village of San Benedetto di Querceto to the southeast, as well as the junction of a network of cart roads and trails leading to the valley road. A half-mile northwest of Quinzano another village, San Martino, facing the western slopes of the mountain, dominated the ridge ascending to the crest. In preparation for the attack the artillery had been softening up the enemy s fortifications, and on October 3rd 5 TOT's had been laid down on Bibele in less than an hour. On the 4th the 2nd Battalion moved up for the assault.

  The plan of attack was first to reduce the enemy positions in the villages. B Company attacked Quinzano while G Company moved over to the northwest to attack San Martino. Quinzano fell by early afternoon, but San Martino held out. Tanks in San Benedetto were meanwhile firing against the enemy on the mountain, F Company was moving up to climb through the ravines on the east, and B Company started up the ridge to the summit. The fighting went on throughout the night against resistance that gave no signs of slackening. The fight for San Martino was still raging in the morning, but B Company began to make steady progress up the ridge, slowly forcing the enemy back, and by midafternoon of October 5th it had occupied the crest. F Company too was making progress clearing the enemy from the northern reaches. San Martino was finally subdued by dark, and the mountain was entirely cleared of the enemy by midnight. The first of the important hill masses dominating the Idice Valley had been captured.

  On the right, the 337th Infantry had gone on from Casoni di Romagna, along the steep ridges, on the 3rd and 4th forcing the enemy back beyond the Villa di Sassonero to within 2 miles of Monterenzio. By now the regiment had advanced well beyond the units on both flanks, and as a result was receiving fire from self-propelled guns on the east and west as well as to the north. An intense counter-battery program was now undertaken by the Division Artillery and plans were made to continue the attack.

  From Monterenzio, 1800 feet high, the enemy commanded the entire intermediate area between the Sillaro and Idice Torrents. A narrow ridge led from Hill 528, nearly a mile south of the crest, through the village of Scaruglio to the summit. A church, a cemetery, and 2 or 3 small buildings occupied a level space at the foot of a large mound. The sides of the ridge fell off in steep, rocky ravines to mountain streams winding through tangled brush 400 feet below. The eastern side of the mountain fell off in cliffs,and the western side formed the wall of a ravine.

  To the south and southeast the enemy held 2 mountain villages, Palmona and Zello, from which he was attempting to block any advance towards Monterenzio. Scaruglio was at the apex of defenses extending along the east of the mountain to Poggiolo, and along the west to the Liano Ridge. A single road led northwest to Baccanello, and the enemy now sent down numerous reinforcements to man his positions here as our attack became imminent.

  For 4 days the regiment made local advances, sent out patrols to feel out the enemy's outpost line, and constructed trails to enable tanks to come up to join in the attack. The cold rain came down intermittently, and the fields were almost quagmires. But the final preparations were completed and meanwhile the units on both flanks were gradually straightening out the line. To strengthen the assault the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry was now attached to the 337th.

  At 6 o'clock on the morning of October 9th the attack jumped off. The 1st Battalion was making the main effort in the center, the 3rd Battalion was on the right, and the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry was on the left. The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve. Artillery was firing against the strong points, and now as earlier planes were bombing and strafing Monterenzio.

  At the very beginning the attacking forces met bitter resistance. The 1st Battalion alone made good progress, advancing 400 yards. Elsewhere the attacking forces were held down during the day and in the fighting that continued into the night, but finally the 1st Battalion of the338th began to make headway. It seemed that the enemy was weakest on our left. He was apparently depending too much on the ruggedness of the terrain to discourage a strong effort in that direction. Accordingly, the 2nd Battalion moved up to the left of the 1st Battalion of the 338th in order to exploit the enemy's weakness.

  At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 10th the attack was renewed with 4 battalions. The mud was now so heavy that no tanks could move up to give direct support, and the attack continued without their help. The 2ndBattalion's advance had been unobserved for some time, and before 10 o'clock it had captured an important hill southwest of Monterenzio. Company A of the 1st Battalion of the 337th had meawhile by-passed the strongpoint of Palmona and succeeded in taking Hill 528, leading to the Monterenzio crest, so surprising the Germans manning the defenses that the position was taken before the enemy could fire a shot. The first important successes had been won, and as if to acknowledge this the enemy's artillery fire was intensified.

  The other attacking units were making steady progress now, though throughout that night and the 11th the enemy was fighting bitterly. But in the Zello area, 50 prisoners had been taken, and next day more were to be captured. On the 12th troops reached the church below the Monterenzio mound only to be trapped, but meanwhile tanks had come up through the mud to add their support, and the attacking forces began to close in from all sides.

  Troops of the 1st Battalion now advanced directly against the strongpoints on the crest, while others moved to the right and left. On the night of the 12th troops of the 3rd Battalion moved north to seize Poggiolo, and cut off the enemy's only route of withdrawal and reinforcement. Now against the last bitter resistance our troops began to converge on the remaining defenders. Three companies had been defending the hill---the 3rd Company, 117^th Grenadier Regiment and the 1st and 3rd Companies, 147^th Grenadier Regiment. On the 13th, 23 Germans gave themselves up. Most of the rest were dead.

  Early in the morning of October 14th, the 339th Infantry relieved the 337th, passing through the forward elements to continue the attack north. As long and bitter and sustained as the battle for Monterenzio had been, there was more to come.

  While the attack on Monterenzio was getting under way, the forces advancing along the Idice were meeting comparable resistance. After our capture of Monte Bibele on the 5th the enemy fell back to ridges extending west of the Idice. Here he planned other delaying, engagements before another major stand on Monte delle Formiche, a 2000-foot mountain rising from the west bank of the Idice, about 2 miles northwest of Monterenzio. As long as he held these 2 features he effectively blocked our passage through the Idice Valley and denied us the use of the valley road to the north.

  After the capture of Bibele the 338^th completed the relief of the 339^th and continued along both sides of the Idice. Several small villages were captured in the advance that went on slowly day by day. Castelnuovo di Bisano was taken after a sharp fight, and on the 10th the regiment had reached positions from which to begin the attack on Formiche. The objective was especially formidable because of the steep cliffs which fell from all sides except the south. It was doubly important to the Germans to hold Formiche since it commanded Highway 65, in the sector of the Division on the left, as well as the Idice Valley road.

  The 2nd Battalion moved up for the final assault on the mountain. Two villages at the foot, Casa del Monte and Maceratoio, were cleared only after a day's heavy fighting. G Company worked its way to the crest on the afternoon of the 11th. Company F came up to reinforce the first troops, and strong enemy counterattacks were repulsed. One other village to the east of the mountain still stubbornly resisted elements of the 3rd Battalion, but when the enemy had been cleared from the cellars of houses he had fortified, and when the northern approaches to Formiche were cut off, it remained only to reduce several fortified positions west of the mountain.

  Tanks were now supporting the attack when conditions permitted, and on both sides of the river the regiment pushed ahead. It proved necessary to clear some villages in house to house fighting, and one village, Baragazza, was attacked under cover of a smoke screen since the approaches afforded no concealment whatever.

  In this phase of the advance elements of the 34^thInfantry Division began to relieve elements of the 338^th Infantry; and by October 15th the part of the regimental sector west of the Idice River had passed to that division. The 338^th then moved along the east of the river to areas near Fiumetta and Savazza, south of Baccanello, prepared to continue the attack northwest of Monterenzio.

  The capture of Formiche and Monterenzio had thrown large group of the enemy into confusion. Among the prisoners now captured were many who came into our lines when they were separated from their units. In the month since the initial attack on the Gothic Line the Division had captured more than 2000 prisoners, and this in itself had strained the enemy's organization. But severe as his losses had been, replacements were still arriving and in enough strength to meet the demands of constant counterattacks.

  The 339^th Infantry captured Hill 622, just east of Santa Anna; and held it against counterattacks. The enemy was defending stubbornly, but the regiment pushed through the fog to capture several important objectives--Hill 602, and Castelvecchio, which overlooked the area to the north for many miles. Hill 532, the Vignale ridge, was taken only after strongly fortified positions were reduced.

  The 338th infantry was gradually advancing through rough country towards Monte Fano, which it captured on the 20th. The 337th had been recommitted that day, taking up positions on Monte Cuccoli, and the 339th was moving along the ridge east of Castelvecchio, in a move coordinated with the advance of the 88th Division on the right towards Monte Grande. On the 22nd further orders were received for the coordinated attack. Other elements of the 337th moved up to Farneto on the ridge east of Cuccoli. The 339th went on to attack Hill 459 north of the Parrocchia di Vignale, and the 338th prepared to move forward from Fano towards the strongpoints of Pizzano and Orbega to the northwest. We were now attacking towards the last dominating range of hills in front of the Po Valley.

  The fighting on Hill 459 was fierce. The enemy had just brought into this sector the fresh troops of the 42nd Light Infantry Division, and these fiercely counterattacked our first forces to reach the hill, overrunning their positions, and killing or capturing most of the advance elements of two platoons, but the 339th continued to hold Hill 532, north of Castelvecchio. On the 22nd and 23rd the 337th infantry seized Monte Castellaro, and in doing so occupied positions well in the lead of the Fifth Army push towards Highway 9 and the Po Valley.  {42nd Light Infantry Division or 42nd Jaeger Division served as a security force behind the front lines until assigned to the front in November 1944.}

  On the 24th they pushed ahead again to attack Monte Mezzano. The first attack made from the south was met half way up by a strong counter-attacking force which was repulsed, but heavy artillery and mortar concentrations falling on the exposed ridge forced the advance elements to withdraw. The next night the attack was resumed from the draws southwest of the mountain, and this was more successful. By dawn of the 25th there was a heavy fog, and the enemy counterattacked behind an intense barrage. Two or perhaps three companies overran our outpost positions, but the defenders held out against heavy odds until reinforcements drove the enemy off and brought the situation under control.

  Holding positions on Mezzano, the Casetta di Vignale (north of Castelvecchio) and Monte Fano, the Division was within striking distance of the Po Valley. The artillery was already firing on objectives north of Highway 9. But it was now evident that the final push into the Valley and beyond would require time for the recuperation of losses and the building up of supplies. Accordingly, on October 26th the Division received orders to establish a defensive line in this sector while preparations were completed for a resumption of the offensive.

  Somewhat later the Division was ordered to withdraw from Mezzano and certain other forward positions in order to make the line more even with the positions held by adjacent units. The general line of defense extended west from Castellaro to Casetta di Vignale and on to localities near Pizzano. Other adjustments were made in the weeks that followed, and defensive positions were held until November 22nd when the Division, relieved from the line, moved to a rest area. {Sgt. Christos H. Karaberis, Company L, 337th Regiment, earned the Medal of Honor for his attack on enemy positions towards their objective of Casoni di Remagna on November 1.  Sgt. Karaberis capt